The fiscal impact of immigration to welfare states of the Scandinavian type by Marianne Frank Hansen et al.
ORIGINAL PAPER Open Access
The fiscal impact of immigration to welfare states
of the Scandinavian type
Marianne Frank Hansen1 &
Marie Louise Schultz-Nielsen2 & Torben Tranæs3
Received: 18 September 2015 /Accepted: 5 February 2017
# The Author(s) 2017. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract In this paper, we examine the potential of immigration to strengthen fiscal
sustainability, which is under pressure by an ageing population in many European
countries. We look at a particularly challenging case, namely that of Denmark, which
has extensive tax-financed welfare programmes that provide a high social safety net.
The analysis is based on a forecast of the entire Danish economy made using a dynamic
computable general equilibrium model with overlapping generations. We present life
cycle estimates of the potential fiscal impact of immigration considering the cost of
immigration on the margin as well as on average. The main conclusion is that
immigrants from Western countries have a positive fiscal impact, while immigrants
from non-Western countries have a large negative one, which is also the case when
considering only non-refugee immigrants. The negative effect is caused by both a weak
labour market performance and early retirement in combination with the universal
Danish welfare schemes.
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1 Introduction
In the debate concerning the challenges presented to a society by an ageing population,
immigration is often mentioned as one of the possible solutions to securing income for
the public purse. But, is it in fact a solution? Is it sensible from an economic point of
view to increase immigration—for the economy in general, and for the public finances
in particular? Moreover, is the answer to this question the same irrespective of the type
of immigration and the type of welfare society under consideration? These questions
are discussed in this paper. The focus will be on the effect of immigration on public
finances, because the effects on the economy as a whole are likely to be small for the
average citizen, being mainly distributional in character (Borjas 1990).1 We examine
specifically a particularly challenging case, namely that of Denmark—a society with
extensive tax-financed welfare programmes that provide a high social safety net.
The high social safety net in Denmark makes it especially difficult for the country to
make immigration a contributory factor to fiscal sustainability, in particular immigra-
tion from poor countries. On the one hand, the expensive income-tax-financed welfare
programmes require a high average employment rate for the operation as such to be
fiscally sustainable, and on the other hand, the high social safety net induces high
effective minimum wages that make it difficult for newcomers to get into employment
unless they are very productive to begin with, which many immigrants from poor
countries tend not to be. Thus, for immigration to improve fiscal sustainability in a
high-spending welfare country, the immigrants’ skills need to be both high and
compatible with the requirements of the labour market. To what extent this is the case
is the topic of this paper.
Specifically, we ask to what extent the various population groups in Denmark
contribute to public finances today, and how much we can expect the immigrant groups
to contribute if we look forward in time. We are interested in the total net effect—
including indirect effects from demographic changes, from educational attainment,
from the labour market, etc.—and for consistency, we therefore make a forecast for
the entire Danish economy. We compute how the net contributions to the public purse
from people of Danish origin and from immigrants and second-generation immigrants
of both Western and non-Western origins—with and without the refugee group—are
expected to change over time.2
In all the computations, public transfers related to individuals (unemployment
benefits, child benefits, taxes, etc.) and all publicly provided services linked to indi-
viduals (education, visits to the doctor, etc.) are assigned to each population group
according to actual use. With regard to the remaining public expenditures, i.e. the costs
of fixed public goods (armed forces, construction of roads and bridges, central admin-
istration, etc.), computations are made both on average where these costs are allocated
equally across all individuals, meaning that immigrants are assigned the average cost of
fixed public goods, and on the margin where these costs are ignored, meaning that the
cost of providing fixed public goods to immigrants is assumed to be zero. The marginal
1 See also the recent summary of the literature on this issue by Peri (2014).
2 The non-Western countries are mainly poor countries, being non-OECD countries or low-income OECD
countries plus a few richer Asian countries, as detailed in Section 2.
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approach is only relevant when considering immigration flows that are small relative to
the size of the population.
In the following, we focus on three computations. First, we compute the annual net
contributions to the public sector from each population group in each year from 2014
and onwards3 with the costs of fixed public goods being allocated equally across all
individuals.
Second, subject to the assumption of equally distributed fixed public goods, we
compute the present values of lifetime net contributions for both the entire cohort born
in 2013 and for each of the population groups studied. We control for both the number
of years of residence in the country and for the particular period of life when individuals
resided in the country. 4 These computations are also conducted for non-Western
immigrants disregarding the group of refugees. This is relevant, because granting
asylum to refugees is motivated by a wish to help, and thus to be compared with
foreign aid rather than being evaluated as an investment to the country.
The results up until this point, with the costs of fixed public goods allocated equally
to both natives and immigrants, suggest that immigration from non-Western countries
represents a net cost to the public purse, while immigration from Western countries
(richer countries) generates a net contribution. However, very small changes in the
population size do not change the cost of providing fixed public goods. So, these results
are not directly applicable for policy changes that only marginally affect the size of the
population. The net fiscal benefit of small (enough) changes in the immigration
population for instance should rather be assessed by setting the cost of providing fixed
public goods to the newcomers to zero. Immediately, we can conclude that the net
benefit to the public purse of Western immigration is positive on the margin, because
this was the case even when the immigrants were allocated their full share of the cost of
fixed public goods. But what about the benefit to the public purse on the margin when
considering immigration from non-Western countries? To answer this question, we
conduct a third computation by changing the yearly inflow of immigrants while
keeping the total costs of fixed public goods unchanged, and then examining how this
would affect public finances, measured in terms of fiscal sustainability. The fiscal
impact of immigration from non-Western countries is found to be negative even when
the provision of fixed public goods is unaffected by their number.
The calculations were carried out using the Danish Rational Economic Agents
Model (DREAM), a dynamic computable general equilibrium model with overlapping
generations. One advantage of working within this model framework is that it ensures
that indirect effects are also included in the calculations. For instance, the tax revenue
from income—for example, profit income—earned by natives, because of immigration,
is included in our computation, thanks to the general equilibrium properties.
Furthermore, the model encompasses projections of population growth, educational
attainment, demographic characteristics and country of origin two generations ahead.
The model predicts the total budget of the public sector year by year, which we will
3 The time horizon of the model is in principle infinite, which is modelled by assuming that the model enters a
steady state in year 2122 (the model runs for 115 periods). To illustrate the direction in which the annual
figures evolve in, we present the results for a year almost between now and then, namely 2050.
4 Here we have taken both return and re-entry migration into account based on the historical pattern.
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summarise and present both as the sustainability indicator (SI)5 measured in percent-
ages of GDP and as the average annual budget surplus in Euro.
The forecast is based on the economic structures of 20086 and assumes a continuation of
these, except that we have taken into account future changes that will occur as a consequence
of reforms approved by Parliament up until 2012. These years represented an all-time low
for the immigrant-native employment gap in Denmark. Aiming to study the potential
contribution of immigration, 2008 is an obvious year on which to base expectations in
order to answer our key question, namely, to what extent might immigration contribute to
fiscal sustainability in a generous welfare state, and does this contribution vary between
different immigrant groups? For robustness, we also simulate a scenario where—like in the
years following 2008—immigrant unemployment is hit disproportionally hard by a perma-
nent shock.
Historically, the mix of immigrants coming to Denmark has on average been weak with
respect to labour market qualifications. This was particularly the case up until the late 1990s,
and in consequence, immigration resulted in a huge deficit to the public purse around the
year 2000. This deficit was solely attributable to immigrants from poor countries (non-
Western). At around the same time, Germany was managing to attract both better-educated
and more experienced immigrants than Denmark (Tranæs and Zimmermann 2004).7
The main reason for the unfavourable mix of immigrants to Denmark in terms of their
employability at the time mentioned was the fact that Denmark received relatively few
migrants who came to the country for work and study purposes. Around the year 2000, only
25% of the residence permits issued to people from non-Western countries were for
employment or education purposes, the remaining 75% being issued to refugees or family
reunification immigrants.
The Danish immigration policy was not in general unusual at the time, apart from during
the decade following the very liberal 1983 immigration act that was mainstreamed in the
years after (see Bauer et al. 2004). Otherwise, it was based on a strict employment migration
control enacted under the economic crises in the early 1970s like in many other European
countries. Similarly, the within-EU migration, the asylum rules and family unification
possibilities was also regulated by more or less the same rules under the EU and the UN,
respectively.
However, the new immigration policy introduced around 2000 changed the picture
described above dramatically, so that by 2008 the share of residence permits granted to
non-Western immigrants for employment and education purposes had reached 80%, and in
addition, the total number of such permits granted had increased.8 This trend in residence
5 This indicator corresponds to the indicator S2 used by the European Commission.
6 The model is calibrated to the economic structures of 2008 adjusted for business cycle effects. Compliance
with the structural features is only ensured at the macro level, leaving e.g. the distribution of labour market
participation and unemployment across gender, age and origin unaltered throughout the forecast period.
7 This is not due to a particular mix of nationalities among the immigrants to Denmark. Compared to the
immigrants to Denmark, the immigrants to Germany were better educated and had longer work experience for
each sending country.
8 The new policy was based on (1) easy access for employment immigrants, (2) new restrictions on asylum
procedures, (3) marriage reunification was restricted by age and time spent in the sending country versus in
Denmark for the couple together (refugees were excepted from these restrictions) and (4) lower social
assistance to non-working newcomers. Thus, the new policy aimed directly at changing the composition of
residence permits in the direction of relatively fewer refugees and family unification permits and more work
and education permits. See Tranæs (2012).
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permits seems to have been associated with an upward trend in employment rates among
non-Western immigrants in Denmark that peaked in 2008 (Tranæs 2012). The gap between
the employment rates of native Danes and non-Western immigrants dropped from 33 to 23
percentage points between 2000 and 2008, and consequently, the contribution from immi-
gration to the public finances improved significantly over that period. Nevertheless, in 2008,
the employment rate of non-Western immigrants was still only 56%, compared to 79% for
natives, and immigration from non-Western countries still created a deficit even under the
assumption that the cost of providing fixed public goods to immigrants was zero, as shown
by Gerdes et al. (2011).9With the coming of the recession, the improvement in employment
integration came to a halt, and in the years 2011 to 2013, it remained constant at a somewhat
lower level than previously, with an employment rate gap between natives and non-Western
immigrants of 26 percentage points. However, the most substantial economic recession in
decades did not send the employment gap back to where it was even around 2000, which
suggests that the policy change during the 2000s has had some structural effects. All in all,
2008 is a good baseline for a projection if we want to study the potential effect of
immigration based on historical experience, and the recession years should then be consid-
ered for robustness.
By considering both cases where immigrants are paying the average per capita
cost of fixed public goods and that of zero under the assumption that the cost of
providing these goods to immigrants is zero (the marginal approach), we are
following Dustmann and Frattini (2013). Although we arrive at the same overall
picture for Denmark as they do for the UK—that immigrants from richer countries
reduce the fiscal burden on the natives of the country and that immigrants from
poor countries perform worse in terms of their contribution than those from richer
countries—we arrive at a less optimistic picture with regard to immigration from
non-Western countries than Dustmann and Frattini do for non-EEA immigrants.
They find that even the recently arrived non-EEA immigrants to the UK make a
positive net contribution to the public purse; we consistently find sizeable negative
net contributions in the case of non-Western immigration to Denmark. The
employment rates of non-Western citizens in Denmark and non-EEA citizens in
the UK are not that different, and although the employment rate of non-Western
immigrants is slightly lower than that of the non-EEA immigrants, the similarity
between the two levels suggests that the difference in the results is mainly linked
to the general differences in the generosity of the two countries’ welfare systems.
This view is supported by the findings in Ruist (2014). Studying the fiscal
implication of immigration from the new EU countries to Sweden, he finds zero
or only small positive fiscal effects, suggesting that the effects of non-EU immi-
gration to Sweden are negative, as the employment rate for these immigrants is
much lower than that for EU immigrants. Altogether this suggests that the mix of
immigrants is important when assessing their fiscal impact, and that for certain
immigrant groups, welfare societies like those of Scandinavia face a considerable
structural challenge with respect to achieving a net surplus for the public purse as
a result of immigration from non-EU countries, something that has been confirmed
later by Ruist (2015) and Flood and Ruist (2015).
9 If refugees are excluded from the calculation, the overall contribution from all immigrants—from both poor
and rich countries—was a small positive amount in 2008.
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The methodological approach applied in the present study is related to that used by
Schou (2006), who also used DREAM to assess the consequences of increasing the
future yearly inflow of immigration by 5400 persons. He found that this increase would
worsen the Danish fiscal sustainability problem by 0.14% of GDP or by 0.49% if all the
immigrants were from non-Western countries and were considered to be paying the
average per capita cost of fixed public goods. Schou does not compute the marginal
costs of immigration, and immigrant employment was significantly lower in his base
year of 2004 than in 2008; both factors tend to increase the financial burden. Other
analyses calculating the net transfers based on cross-sectional data for first- and second-
generation immigrants of Western and non-Western origin confirm this picture; see
Wadensjö (2000, 2007) and Gerdes et al. (2011). Wadensjö and Gerdes (2004) also
show that the net transfers per person are larger for non-Western immigrants in
Denmark than in Germany; as in a similar case of the UK (Dustmann and Frattini
2013), this may be explained by differences in the mix of immigrant populations and
the welfare systems of the countries, as discussed in Hinte and Zimmermann (2014).
This study goes further than previous studies of the fiscal effects of immigration by
(1) considering life cycle estimates of the fiscal impact of different immigration groups
by forecasting from the year with the smallest native-immigrant employment gap in
recent history, (2) considering the fiscal effect of marginal changes in immigration (the
marginal cost of immigration) as well as the fiscal effect of the immigration as such (the
average cost), (3) computing the present values of lifetime net contributions for each
population group controlling for both the number of years of residence in the country
and for the particular periods of life the individuals resided in the country based on
historically observed behaviour including migration patterns and (4) by assessing how
much of the net cost of non-Western immigration is explained by the fact that many of
these immigrants are refugees rather than ordinary immigrants and, thus, not admitted
to the country based on an investment motive but on a desire to help.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the data and the model. In
Section 3, we present the baseline total net contributions year by year for the different
population groups. Section 4 contains the life cycle computations, while Section 5
discusses fiscal sustainability under different possible immigration policies. Finally,
Section 6 concludes and addresses the overriding question of the extent to which
immigration from various parts of the world can contribute to solving the financing
challenges faced by countries such as Denmark as a result of an ageing population.
2 Data and methods
The following provides a brief introduction to DREAM and to the assumptions on
which the calculations are based.
2.1 General description of the model
Our results are based on the DREAM projections of 2013 (DREAM 2013b). The
model estimates long-term economic activities and sustainability of economic policy on
the basis of projections of the demographic composition, level of education and labour
market participation of the Danish population. In particular, the model is frequently
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used to address the question of whether the present fiscal policy or specific changes to it
are sustainable. The DREAM modelling system consists of a number of nested sub-
models which generate input to a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with an
infinite time horizon.
The first sub-model consists of a population projection and is based on assumptions
concerning fertility rates, mortality rates and inward and outward migration including
return and re-entry migration (DREAM 2013a). This projection is made in collabora-
tion with Statistics Denmark and constitutes the official national population projection
for Denmark.10
The next sub-model is concerned with determining the future education behaviour of
the population. Using gender-, age- and origin-specific probabilities concerning the
commencement, continuation, drop-out rate and completion of study programmes, the
distribution of the future population on various education levels is calculated. Then,
using gender-, age-, origin- and education-specific participation rates, the third sub-
model assigns the future population to numerous socioeconomic categories within and
outside the labour force. Hence, the output from the third sub-model establishes the
future proportions of the population within and outside the labour force, which serves
as the primary input in the CGE model. Specifically, the characteristics in terms of
education, employment, earnings, number of children, etc. of the immigrants evolve
from information on gender, age and country of origin according to past experience.
On the basis of the information from the system of sub-models, the model can be
used to forecast several components of the Danish economy. The model consists, first,
of households that supply labour, demand goods and services, accumulate wealth
(savings and pensions) and pay taxes to the public sector. The private sectors demand
labour, produce goods, invest in capital, issue stocks, pay taxes and wages and receive
subsidies. Finally, the public sector employs labour, requires financing from taxation,
provides public services, pays transfers to households and pays interest on public debts.
By taking into account expected future public revenues and spending, the model can be
used to assess whether or not a given fiscal policy is sustainable.
In the DREAM projections of 2013, the size of the shortfall in the sustainability of
fiscal policy measured by the sustainability index, SI, is calculated at −0.04% of GDP,
equivalent to an annual EUR −0.09 billion budget deficit, over the infinite time horizon.
11 This means that the public sector will have a (small) financing need of EUR 0.09
billion every year in the future—which in turn means that future revenue will be
virtually sufficient to cover future costs. After having been in surplus at the onset of
the financial crises, the public budget went into deficit during the recession years. It is
forecast to remain in deficit for many decades to come, as can be seen from Table 1,
which shows key indicators of the macro-performance of the economy. 12 This
10 The projection is based on the previous observed migration pattern as well as on national and international
forecast of future migration flows. In Denmark like in other countries, a part of the emigration is registered
with a significant delay (up to 3 years after the emigration year, beyond which there are few new registrations).
The population and the population forecasts are adjusted for this phenomenon, but it still introduced some
extra uncertainty. This uncertainty has, however, limited consequences for the public finances, because
employment and unemployment are based on registered salaries and benefits actually paid out, and the same
with the tax revenue.
11 As mentioned above, this indicator corresponds to indicator S2 used by the European Commission.
12 In a growing economy, this does not contradict a sustainability index close to zero (−0.04% of GDP).
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calculation is based on the assumption that the current economic policy regime is
continued and that the economic reforms of recent years (up until 2011) are imple-
mented as planned having the expected effects.13
Participation rates are exogenous in DREAM, whereas unemployment is endogenously
responding to the replacement rate between the benefit level and wages. The model is fitted
to reproduce key macro-economic figures until 2020 from the most recent official forecast
by the Ministry of Finance. The projection embodying all of the above is referred to as the
baseline scenario.
The exercise we conduct is the following. Supposing that the economy evolves as
officially expected, what then will be the net contributions to public finances of the different
population groups considered?
3 Distribution of net contributions according to origins of the contributors
In order to divide up net contributions to public funds according to the origin of the
contributors, all income to the Danish public sector should in principle be categorised
according to the contributors’ gender, age and origin. The definition of origin used here is
in accordance with that used by Statistics Denmark (Danmarks Statistik 2013), which in
outline is as follows:
Immigrants were born outside Denmark. Neither of their parents was a Danish
national born in Denmark. Second-generation immigrants 14 are born in Denmark.
Neither of their parents is a Danish national born in Denmark. All individuals,
regardless of their place of birth, who have at least one parent who is a Danish national
born in Denmark, are defined as natives.
In the following, we distinguish between Western and non-Western countries in accor-
dance with the official definition by Statistics Denmark.Western countries comprise the 28
countries of the European Union plus Andorra, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Monaco, Norway,
San Marino, Switzerland, the Vatican State, Canada, the USA, Australia and New Zealand.
All other countries are categorised as non-Western countries. Thus, the rich Asian countries
are also in the non-Western group, and therefore, on average, it is a slightly richer group than
what is usually called developing countries. However, they only compose 0.6% of the
immigrant population in Denmark (both first and second generation).15
Calculations made using DREAM are carried out as follows. First, the
calculation of the overall economic projection is performed, and then the public
sector budget is broken down according to the gender, age and origin of
individuals. In practice, dividing up public income and expenditure requires
the use of a set of distribution keys as described in the Appendix.
13 For a more detailed description of this economic forecast, see DREAM (2013b).
14 In principle, all descendants of immigrants are included in this group if neither of their parents is a Danish
national born in Denmark. In practice, this group currently consists almost entirely of second-generation
immigrants and includes only a few third-generation immigrants.
15 These counties are Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. In any case, it would not
change our conclusion if we were to move all the rich Asian countries from the non-Western to the Western
group. The already big difference in the performance between the two country groups would just be slightly
larger.
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3.1 The composition of net contributions for each population group, 2014
The result of dividing up net contributions according to origin is shown below for
selected years, 2014 and 2050. The calculations are based on the long-term projections
by DREAM (2013b), which tracks the Ministry of Finance’s projected primary budget
balance until the year of 2020. In order to avoid assigning too much weight to major
fluctuations in the primary balance in certain years (for example, because of changes in
the regulations on lump sum pension payments), it was decided to calculate an average
net contribution of the years 2013–2015, and this average is being referred to hereafter
as 2014.
Table 2 shows how the expected annual public revenues and expenditures for 2014
are distributed by country of origin when the principles described above are applied.
The calculations are shown in 2013 values (Euro/DKK=1/7.47). Such a table is
computed for each year from 2013 and to infinity (in principle), which is managed
by assuming that the model enters a steady state in year 2122. The annual figures
constitute the base for both the life cycle computations and the long run fiscal
sustainability measures.
Before looking at average life cycle contributions and fiscal sustainability, we will
take a look at a short-term year, 2014, and a somewhat arbitrary year half a generation
from now, 2050. There is no typical year in terms of demographic composition. The
computations for the 2 years illustrate that some of the generational changes net out
within immigration groups and that more pivotal is the composition of the immigration
by country of origin. In Section 4, we will be considering the long run that fully
incorporates the life cycle aspects.
As Table 2 shows, public revenue from taxes and VAT amounts to EUR 122 billion
for 2014. The single largest item of income to the public purse is taxes deducted at
income source (EUR 43 billion), deriving mostly from the taxation of wages, income
transfers and pension payments. However, other direct taxes (EUR 24 billion) and other
Table 1 Macro-economic development, baseline projection
2008 2015 2050
Level, EUR billions Index (fixed prices);
2008 = 100
GDP EUR 230 billion 103 193
Private consumption 110 105 195
Public consumption 62 104 202
Net exports 11 117 52
Investments 47 95 208
Employment, no. 2,581,000 102 115
Unemployment, % 3.8 4.0 3.1
Retirement, age where public pension starts 65 65 69
Budget surplus, public sector, as % of GDP 2.3 −2.9 −2.3
Net foreign debt, as % of GDP −6.7 2.6 −24.5
Source: DREAM (2013b)
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indirect taxes (EUR 28 billion) are also very significant. Other types of income
contribute EUR 13 billion, while VAT from households makes up EUR 13 billion.
On the outgoing side of the balance sheet, EUR 48 billion is spent on individual
services, mainly in the areas of health, welfare and education, with sums of EUR 19
billion, EUR 14 billion and EUR 13 billion, respectively, for 2014. Expenditures on
income replacement amount to EUR 39 billion, with old-age pensions (EUR 14 billion)
as a major item. Fixed public spending (EUR 19 billion) is also a large item.
Since natives make up 89% of the population of Denmark, by far the greatest
proportion of state income and expenditure is linked to this group. However, the
contributions made by natives in the form of taxes and duties are a little smaller than
the public expenditures targeted at this specific group. Hence, for 2014, the total net
contribution from all natives is negative, EUR −2.7 billion. First-generation Western
immigrants, in contrast, make a positive net contribution of EUR 0.7 billion, while
second-generation Western immigrants make a negative net contribution of EUR −0.2
billion. In total, non-natives of Western origin living in Denmark make a positive net
contribution to public funds of EUR 0.5 billion.
The fact that the net contribution is greater for first-generation immigrants than for
the second generation is due in particular to the second generation being young and,
therefore, not yet contributing significantly via tax payments. Seven out of ten second-
generation Western immigrants are under 30 years of age (Danmarks Statistik 2013),
whereas this is only the case for approximately one in three first-generation Western
immigrants and natives.




















90.9 3.7 0.2 4.5 0.8 121.67
Expenditure on
Income replacement 90.2 2.6 0.2 5.6 1.1 −39.42
Public individual
consumption
90.3 2.5 0.4 3.7 3.0 −47.83
Fixed public goods 88.8 3.6 0.4 4.9 2.3 −18.99
Other expenditures 88.7 4.0 0.3 5.5 1.4 −19.82
Total net contributions,
EUR billion
−2.65 0.7 −0.19 −0.55 −1.68 −4.4
Proportion of the
population (%)
89.0 3.5 0.4 4.9 2.3 100
Source: DREAM projection of 2013 and own calculations
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The net contribution is negative for people of non-Western origin as a whole,
totalling EUR −2.2 billion, which is approximately 1% of GDP. For the first generation,
the net contribution in 2014 is EUR −0.55 billion, while for second-generation
immigrants, it is EUR −1.7 billion. Here again, the second-generation immigrants are
much younger than the first generation, with nine out of ten second-generation non-
Western immigrants being under the age of 30. Consequently, revenue from taxes is
low for this group, while in particular, expenditures related to education and care are
high.
The fact that net contributions from non-Western immigrants are lower than those
fromWestern immigrants is due to a lower rate of employment among non-Westerners,
rather than any difference in age structure between the two immigrant groups. This
leads to lower revenue from taxes and higher expenditure on social income transfers.
3.2 The expected net contributions half a generation ahead
To get an idea about where the projection is heading, we briefly present some level
figures for 2050, a little less than half way towards the steady-state year of the model.
The natives will make up 84% of the total population in 2050 down from 89%, while
non-Western immigrants and second-generation immigrants will make up 6.1 and 4.3%
of the population, respectively, up from 4.9 and 2.3%. Western first- and second-
generation immigrants will comprise 4.5 and 1.6%, up from 3.5 and 0.4%. The
distribution of public expenditures and incomes among population groups can be found
in Table 3.
The total net contribution to public finances by natives in 2050 is expected to be
EUR −1.8 billion. For first-generation Western immigrants, it is estimated that it will be
EUR 1.5 billion, with the contribution from second-generation Western immigrants
being EUR −0.24 billion—overall, an expected surplus of EUR 1.2 billion from
immigrants of Western origin.
The net contribution in 2050 is expected to be negative for people of non-Western
origin, totalling EUR −0.8 billion. In contrast to the situation in 2014, the first
generation of immigrants will make a large negative net contribution (EUR −1.6
billion), while the second generation will contribute a positive sum (EUR 0.8 billion).
This development will be largely attributable to changes in the age composition of the
groups. Simplifying a little, we can say that the second-generation non-Western
immigrants who were children in 2014 will have grown up by 2050 and become part
of the workforce, while their parents will have aged and retired from work. At the same
time, it is assumed that new non-Western immigrants will have settled in Denmark, and
new second-generation immigrants will have been born—factors which will obviously
affect the situation. Overall, however, it is expected that only four out of ten second-
generation non-Western immigrants will be aged under 30 in 2050, and that, of course,
makes a very substantial difference—compared to 2014—when calculating the net
contribution from this group.
The Danish universal old-age pension system together with the social safety net
implies that changes in the rate of employment and in the age composition are the main
reasons that the net negative contributions to the public purse from the non-Western
group will become less in magnitude over the period, but will nevertheless remain
substantial in 2050. Table 4 shows that the employment rate for the non-Western group
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of working age is projected to increase from 50.3% in 2014 to 60.1% in 2050, while the
employment rate of the entire non-Western population above 16 years of age will
increase only from 47.6% in 2014 to 50.4% in 2050. Thus, the large increase in
employment among working-age non-Western immigrants will be almost completely
offset by there being more retired non-Western immigrants—and both pensioners and
the unemployed receive social benefits. These calculations illustrate how important the
age composition of the population is for net public contributions.
The general increase in the employment rates is due to the assumed decrease in
unemployment from 4 to 3% and to an increase in the retirement age from 65 today to
69 in year 2050.
In order to see whether the negative net contributions are due purely to inauspicious
demographic developments or whether weak labour market performance is also a major
contributing factor, we consider the net contribution over time of the average member
of the population in the next section.
4 Present value of the net lifetime contributions of the 2013 cohort
This section calculates the net contributions to public finances made over the course of
a lifetime. In other words, we calculate how much an individual from a specific
population group can be expected to contribute to public funds on average in each
year of that person’s life spent in Denmark. By studying the fiscal impact in this way,
we control for the different sizes of the population groups, and for the fact that the net
annual contribution varies over the course of a lifetime.


















83.9 4.9 1.1 5.8 4.2 131.91
Expenditure on
Income replacement 82.4 3.5 0.9 9.9 2.8 −35.14
Public individual
consumption
86.4 3.2 1.5 5.5 3.5 −57.6
Fixed public goods 83.4 4.5 1.6 6.1 4.4 −20.22
Other expenditures 82.5 5.1 1.4 7.0 4.1 −20.33
Total net contributions,
EUR billion
−1.78 1.46 −0.24 −1.64 0.83 −1.37
Proportion of the
population (%)
83.5 4.5 1.6 6.1 4.3 100
Source: Special run of DREAM and own calculations
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The calculation is based on people born in 2013, henceforth referred to as ‘the 2013
cohort’. Tracking a cohort and calculating its average net contributions over the course
of a lifetime has the advantage that the calculation does not depend on the age
composition and size of the population at a given point in time. This facilitates
comparison across population groups.
Below, we first construct the 2013 cohort. Then, we assign age-dependent public
revenues and expenditures to each population group, and finally, by taking into account
the number of years of residence in Denmark, the average present-value net contribution
can be computed for each population group. The contribution is measured in Euro per
person-year; one person living in Denmark for 10 years thus counts as 10 person-years.
4.1 The 2013 cohort
Figure 1 depicts a projection of the population belonging to the 2013 cohort. The bold
line shows the total number of people in the cohort. The black line indicates the number
of natives, while the grey and dotted lines show the numbers of first-generation and
second-generation immigrants from non-Western countries, respectively. Western im-
migrants and second-generation immigrants are included in the total number but are not
shown separately in the figure.
At age zero, the cohort consists of approximately 60,000 people, of whom the
majority (53,000) are natives. The cohort includes nearly 6000 second-generation
immigrants, primarily of non-Western origin. The total number of cohort members will
rise between the ages of 20 and 30, reaching a high point of almost 70,000. This is due
to net immigration of those who were born abroad in the year of 2013. Of the 10,000
immigrants, around half will stem from non-Western countries; however, the proportion
of non-Western immigrants will increase to around 65% as the cohort ages, because it is
expected that a large proportion of the Western immigrants will leave the country again.
4.2 Total contributions to public finances by population groups
In order to calculate the net contribution of a specific population group, public sector
revenues and expenditures are distributed between the various population groups as



















2014 58.4 53.5 60.4 53.9 45.6 58.2 47.6
2050 60.5 57.7 67.6 59.6 38.2 72.5 50.4
Aged 17–64
2014 74.1 60.6 66.7 61.0 48.7 58.3 50.3
2050 78.3 65.7 69.5 66.6 50.0 73.3 60.1
Source: DREAM projection of 2013
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discussed previously. In general terms, the income from taxable individuals comes from
the adult population, while expenditures are spread across all age groups.
Figure 2 provides a more detailed picture of how the expenditures are distributed.
Total projected expenditures over a lifetime for the 2013 cohort are broken down into
expenditure types. The figure shows that for pre-school-age children, expenditures
related to individual care make up the largest proportion of public spending. These
expenditures primarily concern day care. From school age onwards—not surprising-
ly—costs regarding education dominate, right through until the age of 20, after which
educational costs gradually decline. After this, the cost of transfer incomes gradually
becomes more significant, and at the same time, individual health expenses begin to
rise, though from a fairly low level. The cost of transfer incomes becomes the dominant
Fig. 1 Numbers of people in the 2013 cohort. Source: DREAM projection of 2013
Fig. 2 Distribution of public expenditures over the course of a lifetime for the 2013 cohort. Source: DREAM
projection of 2013
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expenditure item right through until the age of around 80, after which health expendi-
ture gradually takes over as the major cost as the cohort becomes older and more in
need of care. Total costs will peak around the age of 85, after which they decrease as the
cohort dies out.
Total net contributions of the entire 2013 cohort are shown in Fig. 3. The net
contributions are divided into public revenues and expenditure over the lifetime of an
individual. The dotted line in Fig. 3 shows total expenses over a lifetime and, thus,
corresponds to the sum of expenses at each age shown in Fig. 2. Over the course of a
lifetime, total expenses of the 2013 cohort will remain at a relatively constant level of
around EUR 1.3 billion per year (in 2013 values) until around age 50, where after the
expenditures will begin to rise, as stated above, peaking at around age 85.
The grey line in Fig. 3 shows total public revenue, deriving in particular from taxes
deducted at source (taxes on wages, transfer incomes and pensions) and from indirect
taxes. Individuals under the age of 17 are assumed not to receive taxable income, hence
not contributing to the public sector revenue. From the age of 17 and onwards, personal
income is generated, and thus, transfers from households to the public sector will occur.
Tax revenues from the 2013 cohort will rise rapidly over the period up until around age
45, when employment and consequently incomes will peak. After this, public revenue
declines gradually as retirement age approaches. The increase in public revenue
predicted at around age 80 is due to taxes on old-age pension payments.
The black line shows the overall net contribution and, thus, represents the difference
between public sector revenue and expenditure. Since there is no public revenue before
the age of 17, net contributions track public expenditure up until this point. From then
onwards, tax revenue, and thus net contributions, rise—and from age 20 onwards, the
net contribution will be positive. The increasing revenues and subsequently increasing
net contributions will peak at around age 45 and thereafter will begin to fall, as a
consequence of declining tax revenues and because expenditures increase as individ-
uals grow older. The net contribution will become negative once more at around the age
of 75.
As described in Section 2, revenues and expenditures can be assigned to the various
population groups. The result of this procedure is shown in Fig. 4, which depicts the net
contributions of natives, non-Western immigrants and second-generation immigrants.
Fig. 3 Net contributions of the 2013 cohort. Source: DREAM projection of 2013
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The total age-dependent net contribution of natives belonging to the 2013 cohort is
indicated by a black line, which corresponds very closely to the total net contributions
shown in Fig. 3. This is hardly surprising given that natives constitute the majority of
the population, as indicated in Fig. 1.
The non-Western first-generation and second-generation immigrants constitute small
population groups; their total net contributions (which are also on a much smaller scale)
can be read using the right-hand scale in the figure. It should be noted that it is only
between the ages 20 and 50 that first-generation immigrants are projected to make a
positive net contribution to public finances, while the contributions from natives and
second-generation non-Western immigrants are expected to be positive between the
ages of 20 and 75. In particular, this is the outcome of the fact that non-Western
immigrants are expected to have significantly lower rates of employment and earnings,
resulting in lower tax revenues and higher transfer incomes compared to the other
population groups.
4.3 Calculating the present value of net contributions by origin
From the total net contributions of the 2013 cohort, the average net contributions per
person-year can be calculated for each population group. This measures the extent to
which an average individual from the group in question will contribute (positively or
negatively) to the public finances in each year during his or her lifetime in Denmark. In
practice, this calculation is made by discounting backwards the annual net contributions
of the 2013 cohort to the year 2013,16 and then dividing the amount by the number of
person-years.
The number of person-years is calculated as the sum of lifetime years of the
members of the 2013 cohort. By the age of 80, a native who has lived his or her entire
life in Denmark is thus counted as contributing 80 person-years, whereas an 80-year-
Fig. 4 Total net contributions of the 2013 cohort, by origin. Source: DREAM projection of 2013
16 The net contribution in 2013 values is discounted by 1.4% per year, which is the predicted real rate of
interest, corrected for growth, to which the public sector is subject.
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old immigrant who arrived in Denmark at the age of 20 only contributes 60 person-
years to the total number of person-years of the cohort. The predicted total number of
person-years of the entire 2013 cohort is 5,857,711. Since the present value of the total
net contributions of the 2013 cohort is calculated as being EUR −3.7 billion, the
average net contribution per person-year is EUR −637 for each cohort member. In
other words, a member of the 2013 cohort will on average benefit to the tune of EUR
637 per year from public funds throughout his or her lifetime while residing in
Denmark.
As mentioned in the introduction, the annual deficit on Denmark’s primary budget
balance is ‘only’ EUR 0.09 billion per year. The reason that the negative contribution of
the 2013 cohort is not expected to give rise to great concern is that a sustainable fiscal
policy does not require that total revenues should cover all spending for all future
generations. This in turn is due to that fact that at the time the members of the 2013
cohort were born, there was an existing population, who had already had many of their
expenses paid for—day care, schooling, etc.—and who can therefore be expected to
constitute a net surplus for the public purse in the future.
Table 5 shows the net contributions per person-year, distributed by origin. As
mentioned previously, the average person in the 2013 cohort will benefit from public
spending, with net contributions of EUR −637 per year. The natives generate a net
surplus of EUR −695, which is about 50% of the amount generated by second-
generation non-Western immigrants at EUR −1070. Only for immigrants of Western
origin the figures are positive, at EUR 2546 and EUR 47 for first-generation and
second-generation immigrants, respectively, compared to EUR −2238 and EUR −1070
for first and second non-Western immigrants.17 The contribution is higher for first-
generation than for second-generation Western immigrants partly because many first-
generation immigrants arrive after school age, and consequently, their day care and
their schooling are not paid for by the Danish Exchequer. To a large extent, non-
Western immigrants will also have spent their school years outside Denmark. However,
their relationship to the labour market is expected to be much weaker than that of the
other population groups, resulting in a large net negative contribution, even though they
arrive late on average and do have a relatively high propensity to re-emigrate. The first-
generation immigrants from Western countries have the highest propensity to re-
emigrate though, which results in a reduction in expenses related to old age and thus
contributes significantly to their sizable net contribution.
The net contribution of natives is also in between the contribution of the two second-
generation population groups, but these three groups are much more alike as expected,
because they are all born in Denmark. They draw on public services about the same,
but the second-generation non-Western group does not perform as well as natives on
the labour market, they are poorly educated compared to natives, and although the
educational gap is diminishing (mainly due to the women), they continue to lag behind.
The second-generation Western immigrants perform almost as well as the natives on
the labour market; their employment rate is lower but they are better educated and earn
17 These figures illustrate that a net surplus to the public purse from immigration is going to depend crucially
on the composition with respect to both country of origin and age at arrival. When, for instance, Storesletten
(2003) in a pointing paper on this issue gets a small negative return to the government from immigration, it
mainly reflects the composition of immigrant in Sweden at that time, by age but also by country of origin
which is not part of his analysis.
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more. It is also an important contributing factor that some second-generation Western
immigrants spend years during childhood and adolescence abroad. This is also the case
for second-generation non-Western immigrants, but to a lesser extent.
Many young (Western) migrants are in Denmark to study just as Danes are going
abroad to study saving the Danish taxpayers money. Viewing this as a kind of an
exchange, one could argue that the number of Danes studying abroad should be
subtracted from the number of foreign students in Denmark and instead added to the
number of natives. However, the Danish students studying in a non-Western country
amounts to only 0.5% of the non-Western (first generation) immigrant population in
Denmark, and thus, our result concerning the non-Western population would only be
affected very marginally. With respect to Danes studying in a Western country, it is
more of an issue. In fact, Danes studying in Western countries amount to 4% of the
Western (first generation) immigrant population living in Denmark. Thus, the result for
native and Western immigrants would be somehow affected, making Western immi-
grants an even better deal for Denmark by making the net deficit of natives even bigger
relatively to Western immigrants.
4.4 The influence of refugees
When Denmark accepts refugees, it is primarily for humanitarian reasons and a desire
to live up to its obligations under the relevant international conventions rather than an
attempt to overcome a demographic challenge. When discussing whether future labour
shortages can be resolved through immigration, it is therefore relevant to distinguish
between refugees and other immigrants.
In general, refugees residing in Denmark exhibit a lower rate of labour force
participation than other non-Western immigrants. This is partly due to the traumatic
events experienced by some refugees, which result in temporary or permanent health
damage. It is, to some extent, also due to the fact that refugees during the last couple of
decades have come from the very poorest of the non-Western countries and therefore
often have little education and work experience.
In order to calculate the average net contributions among non-refugees, an adjust-
ment has been made whereby the labour market participation rate of refugees is
adjusted to the typical historical level for non-Western immigrants who are not
refugees. The adjustment is illustrated in Fig. 5, where the age-dependent labour force
participation rate is depicted for all non-Western immigrants in 2012. As shown,
changing the refugee labour force participation rate leads to a significant rise in the
Table 5 Average net contribu-
tions per person-year of the 2013
cohort, in 2013 values (EUR)




Immigrants from non-Western countries −2238
Immigrants from Western countries 2546
Second-generation immigrants from non-Western countries −1070
Second-generation immigrants from Western countries 47
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participation rate of non-Western immigrants above the age of 30. For non-Western
immigrants under the age of 30, the adjustment results in a fall in the participation rate,
since a large fraction of non-Western immigrants in this age group are students; their
participation rate is inferior to that of refugees. The overall change in non-Western
labour market participation resulting from the change in refugee participation is
implemented in the DREAM model. Consequently, the net contribution of the non-
Western immigrants can be calculated from the adjusted long-term forecast. Overall,
the adjustment for refugees results in a rise in the labour force participation rate and,
subsequently, an improvement in the average net contribution of non-Western immi-
grants as shown in Table 6. The table shows that the average net contribution per
person-year for non-Western immigrants in the 2013 cohort would rise from EUR
−2238 to EUR −1738 if we control for refugees in the manner described above; that is,
a 22% smaller deficit.18 The contribution would remain significantly lower than that of
natives (EUR −695) and especially than that of Western immigrants (EUR 2546).
The calculation also illustrates that there is considerable potential for improvement
through better integration, given that these—admittedly not trivial—changes regarding
labour market participation generate a significant improvement in the net contribution if
refugees had a participation rate similar to that of other non-Western immigrants. Such
improvements are challenged by the fact that the lower participation rate of refugees
compared to other non-Western immigrants reflects a variety of differences between the
two groups. During the recent couple of decades, refugees have primarily arrived form
18 The reason why the change is not larger when disregarding the refugees is because the difference between
the two groups is not that significant. Many refugees obtain jobs and some non-refugee, non-Western
immigrant perform pretty poorly on the labour market. Furthermore, only a relatively small fraction of the
refugees are newcomers who are the ones with the most immense employment problems. After 10 years
(1 year) in Denmark, the employment rate for refugees is 41% (10%), and for non-refugee, non-Western
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Fig. 5 Age-related labour force participation rate in 2012, percent. Source: DREAM and own calculations
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very poor countries; they are less educated and have many more health issues compared
to other non-Western immigrants.
Both the non-Western and the Western groups are very heterogeneous and their
subgroups fare very differently on average. Although the best integrated non-Western
immigrant group still has an employment rate significantly below the natives’ of 79%
in 2014 (e.g. immigrants from Thailand with an employment rate of 62%), it is more
than double the size of the employment rate of the poorest integrated group (e.g.
immigrants from Somalia, with an employment rate of 28%). However, the DREAM
macro-model framework cannot handle such heterogeneity, and therefore, we only
consider the refugee, non-refugee issue here in addition to the Western, non-Western
one.
5 The marginal fiscal effects of non-Western immigration
In order to capture the total fiscal impact of immigration, we will, in this section,
include two important indirect effects in the computations. The first effect is that
immigrants have children. Until this point, we have been focusing on the net contri-
butions of each group separately and, thus, not associated the costs of children to their
parents. The second indirect effect is that immigration impacts the overall economy,
leading to changes in the relative prices and thus the overall allocation. This section
considers the marginal effects of immigration on fiscal sustainability, and here we will
take into account the aforementioned indirect effects.
In the previous calculations, it has been assumed that a proportional share of the
costs of fixed public goods has been distributed to all population groups. It can be
argued that not all public expenditures should be considered as responding to small
changes in the size of the population. If the costs of defence, administration and roads
do not increase with a marginal increase in the size of the population, or if there are
economies of scale, then the additional expenditures resulting from the admission of
more members of the population will be below the overall average cost.19 In principle,
the same could apply to state revenues; but as we have noted earlier, the revenues of the
19 It should be noted that in the immigration literature, expenses related to embassies, immigration officers and
the like are traditionally regarded as part of a country’s border control and not a cost of immigration, which
only counts costs and benefits after a person has been granted a residence permit.
Table 6 Average net contributions per person-year of the 2013 cohort, in 2013 values (EUR)
Population
Immigrants from non-Western countries −2238
Immigrants from non-Western countries, adjusting average labour force participation
by simulating improved behaviour of refugeesa
−1738
Source: Special run of DREAM and own calculations
a Calculations made with the labour force participation rate of refugees adjusted so that it corresponds to the
level of other non-Western immigrants. The calculations were made using an updated version of the DREAM
long-term economic projections of 2011
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public sector largely stem from taxes paid by individuals, so in fact the income side of
the public account is more closely related to the size of the population.
When immigration policy is under discussion, it is in fact the question of changes to
expenditure of marginal changes in population size that should be considered.
Therefore, in this section, we aim to perform marginal calculations by making small
annual changes to the population stock of immigrants—one in thousand—while at the
same time keeping the cost of providing the fixed public goods constant.
This is a downwards biased estimate, because the cost of providing a given standard
with respect to fixed public goods is never entirely zero. We consider zero to be a good
approximation when we consider changes in population size of one in thousands,
which is the case when immigration is reduced by say 5000 during a single year
(0.09% of the population to be exact), but for instance after 30 years with an annual
drop in immigration of 5000, the accumulated change has grown to 2.5% of the
population (controlling for mortality and re-migration). Therefore, we also present
another estimate of the change in fiscal sustainability assuming that all new immigrants
initiate a proportional increase in the costs of providing fixed public goods to the
citizens, proportional to the increase in GDP.20
5.1 The exercise: changing the annual immigration
The deviation from our baseline projection used in the following consists of an
assumed reduction of 5000 persons in the annual inflow of non-Western immigrants
from 2013 onwards. There is no significance in the choice of this particular figure of
5000, other than that it is approximately 0.1% of the population and easy to scale up
and down, since the results are scalable to a large extent. The change is shown in Fig. 6,
where the projected reductions in size of the population up until 2050 are shown by
origin.
Overall, the alternative projection leads to a reduction in the entire Danish popula-
tion by 152,000 individuals in the year 2050 relative to the baseline projection. The
majority of the reduction (around 98,000) is in the size of the non-Western immigrant
group (first generation) and, thus, represents a direct effect of the reduction in immi-
gration after taking into account expected re-migration and mortality.
The size of the population of second-generation non-Western immigrants is of
course affected as well, since there will be fewer children born when there are fewer
women of reproductive age. In 2050, therefore, there would be 37,000 fewer non-
Western second-generation immigrants. Some non-Western immigrants to Denmark
marry Danish nationals born in Denmark. According to the Statistics Denmark system
of classification, the children of such individuals are considered as being of Danish
origin. This means that a reduction in the number of non-Western immigrants also leads
to a reduction in the number of natives in the population by approximately 17,000 in
2050.
When the population is reduced in size, the workforce also becomes smaller—but
the amount by which the workforce is reduced and the timing of the reduction depend
20 Technically, the fixed public goods is kept in a constant proportion to GDP. When calculating net
contributions, the total cost of fixed public goods is distributed equally among population groups.
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on the composition of the various population groups and their expected levels of
participation in the labour market.
The calculations in this case show an expected reduction in the workforce by 62,000
in 2050—a reduction which appears relatively modest in comparison with the reduction
in the whole population by 152,000.
There would be almost 50,000 fewer non-Western immigrants in the workforce by
2050, while the numbers of second-generation non-Western immigrants and natives
would be reduced by around 10,000 and 3500, respectively. The reduction in the
number of natives and second-generation immigrants in the workforce would begin
to take effect from 2035, when the second-generation immigrants are old enough to
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Fig. 7 Change in the size of the workforce relative to the baseline projection for various population groups, in



































































Fig. 6 Reduced immigration: changes in population size relative to the baseline projection. Number of
individuals. Source: Special run of DREAM
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The changes in the size of the workforce are shown until 2050, but the reduction
continues in subsequent years and is taken into account when assessing the fiscal
consequences of the reduction in the immigration level (see below).
5.2 The effect on fiscal sustainability of changing the immigration inflow
When the workforce is reduced, it leads to a reduction in the number of people in
employment as well. The aforementioned fall in annual immigration would reduce
employment by 2% and GDP by 1.4% in the year 2050 relative to the baseline
projection. GDP per capita would thus increase from EUR 41,830 to EUR 42,440, or
by 1.4%. Nominal wages would increase by 0.5% and real wages by 0.4%.
As discussed previously, expenditure on fixed public goods is initially assumed to be
unaltered, while public expenditure related to individuals would be reduced by 2.1%,
producing an overall reduction of 1.6% in total public spending in 2050 relative to the
baseline projection.
The reduced level of economic activity would lead to a reduction in corporate
investment and induce companies to raise prices in order to compensate for the lower
production level. This in turn would lead to a reduction in exports in 2050 by
approximately 1%. However, due to lower production, lower sum of wages and hence
lower demand for foreign goods and production inputs by companies and households,
imports would also fall. The reduction in imports would be greater than the reduction in
exports; hence, net exports would rise by 1.6% in 2050.
In total, the calculations show that the public budget would improve (relative to
GDP) compared to the baseline projection. This is basically because the rate of labour
market participation and the productivity of non-Western immigrants are too low to
compensate for the increased public consumption that they generate. The positive effect
is furthermore a result of the decrease in the number of second-generation immigrants,
which we have learned from the previous sections are also negative net contributors.
Table 7 shows the annual changes in both the primary budget balance and in the
sustainability indicator. The starting point is a calculation based on our baseline
projection, in which the sustainability indicator is −0.04% of GDP and thus practically
consistent with fiscal sustainability. This corresponds to a permanent annual deficit in
public finances of EUR 0.09 billion.
If the budget balance is distributed according to contributors’ origins, as outlined in
Section 3, the annual contribution of natives is EUR 0.2 billion, while Western
immigrants and Western second-generation immigrants contribute EUR 1 billion and
EUR 0.08 billion, respectively. For non-Western immigrants, the net contribution is
negative at EUR −1.3 billion, while for second-generation non-Western immigrants, it
is EUR −0.05 billion.
The effects of an annual downward adjustment in immigration by 5000 non-Western
immigrants are shown in Table 7. The sustainability indicator becomes positive at
0.08% of GDP, which corresponds to an annual improvement of the primary balance of
EUR 0.2 billion. This means that the sustainability indicator is improved by 0.12
percentage points, and the primary balance by EUR 0.28 billion annually compared
to the baseline scenario. A small part of the improvement (EUR 0.04 billion) is
attributable to the effects derived from natives and individuals of Western origins and
from second-generation non-Western immigrants (EUR 0.01 billion). However, the
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largest element of the contribution comes from an improvement by EUR 0.2 billion
from the non-Western immigrant group.
As mentioned above, the change in SI of 0.12 is a conservative estimate assuming
zero influence on the cost of providing fixed public goods. An alternative is to assume a
reduction in government spending on fixed public goods proportionally to the change
in GDP. Under this assumption, the fiscal SI would improve by 0.32% of GDP, if non-
Western immigration is reduced by 5000 annually.
Even the proportional estimate of the improvement in SI, 0.32, is significantly lower
than the 0.49 estimated by Schou (2006) for the same immigrant groups. He considers
the same estimator and the difference is explained by a strong improvement in labour
force participation rates among non-Western immigrants between 2001 and 2008, some
of which was due to political reforms and some due to a booming economy.
Finally, we assess the robustness of the results with respect to the immigrants’
success on the labour market. Especially, we are curious to know whether the disper-
sion in unemployment rates between immigrants and natives of 2008 is of significant
importance to the result. Between 2008 and 2011, the great recession implied signif-
icant increases in unemployment in Denmark, and the unemployment increased rela-
tively more for non-Western immigrants. To investigate this issue, we conduct an
alternative computation of the 5000-fewer-immigrants-per-year scenario above in
which we increase the unemployment rate of non-Western immigrants (by two per-
centage points) keeping the one of natives (and Western immigrants) fixed so as to
mimic the actual unemployment difference between the two groups between 2011 and
2013, the bottom of the great recession in Denmark, which was around 7.7 percentage
points compared to 5.8 percentage points in 2008.
Table 7 Permanent changes in the primary balance in EUR billions in 2013 (2012 values) and in the
sustainability indicator (SI), distributed according to origin, as percentages of GDP







EUR billions EUR bn SIa
Baseline
projectionb





−1.07 −0.04 0.99 0.08 0.22 0.19 0.08 0.28c
Difference 0.23 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.28 0.12 0.32c
Source: Special run of DREAM
a Sustainability indicator (similar to that the S2 used by the European Commission)
b The baseline projection is from DREAM’s long-term economic projection of 2013
c This is the SI in case fixed public goods are reduced proportionally to the decrease in GDP, to be compared
with the estimate to the left based on the assumption that a change in immigration does not change the
provision of the fixed public goods
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The results did not change much. Instead of improving sustainability by 0.12% of
GDP according to our conservative estimate, an annual reduction in non-Western
immigration improves the SI by 0.13% of GDP. The proportional estimate of our
experiment is practically unchanged, because the difference between the two estimates
is defined by the cost of fixed public goods that does not depend directly on labour
market status.21 Looking at the average net contribution per person per year of the 2013
cohort, that did not change much either. In the conservative scenario with constant
spending on fixed public goods, it decreased from −2238 EUR to −2364 EUR for the
non-Western immigrant group for whom the unemployment assumption was changed.
Thus, given the structure of the Danish economy and the pattern of immigration, the
fiscal sustainability is affected by a magnitude between 0.12 percentage points and 0.32
percentage points of GDP when the annual inflow of non-Western immigrants changes
by 5000 individuals, a change representing approximately 0.1% of the total population
annually.
6 Summary and conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the fiscal implications of immigration to Denmark. A
general result throughout the paper is that the fiscal impact of immigration depends
crucially on the sending country. The expected fiscal impact of the entire non-Western
population group residing in Denmark will amount to a deficit of around 1% of GDP in
2014, and in the year 2050, residents of non-Western origin will still be making a
negative net contribution adding to the challenges of the Danish welfare state—
challenges which will exist in part as a consequence of the ageing population. The
population of Western origin will oppositely be generating a net surplus both in 2014
and in 2050. The reasons for the expected deficits lie in the weak labour market
performance of non-Western immigrants as a group and the fact that people with a
low level of education, which includes many non-Western immigrants, tend to retire
early; both these factors operate in combination with the universal Danish welfare
system.
Apart from this first cross-section computation, we have performed two other types
of computations both forward looking. Our second computation looks at the average
net contribution per person to the public purse for each year that an individual is in
Denmark, and we present an average for each of the five population groups considered.
This analysis shows that second-generation non-Western immigrants have come a long
way in comparison with their parents in terms of their financial relationship with the
welfare state. Although the second-generation non-Western immigrants make a nega-
tive contribution of almost twice the level of natives (who also make a negative net
contribution), the first-generation makes a net cost of three times the level of natives.
Disregarding the refugee group decreases the net cost of non-Western immigrants by
around 20%.
21 It is only ‘practically unchanged’ because a change in employment of immigrants affects total employment
and thus relative prices.
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By way of comparison, first-generation Western immigrants on average make
a significant positive net contribution to public funds, while second-generation
Western immigrants more or less break even. The difference to the natives is
mainly explained by the fact that the second-generation Western immigrants are
better educated than natives and that many spend some years outside the
country during childhood and adolescence. By focusing on net average contri-
butions of each origin and generation group in isolation, these computations
neither allow us to identify the impact of immigration on the overall economy
nor the relationship between immigrants and their children, something that
affects the public purse in a nontrivial way. Thus, our third computation aims
at quantifying these indirect effects by performing a marginal shock to the
population using a dynamic computable general equilibrium model with over-
lapping generations. Here we calculate how fiscal sustainability responds to
changes in the population induced by a reduction in annual immigration flows.
We show that the last 5000 people in the annual immigration forecast will
create an additional deficit for the public finances of, on average, EUR 0.3
billion per year, which is equivalent to a decrease in the fiscal sustainability
indicator of 0.12 percentage points. This result is robust to the way the native-
immigrant unemployment gap changes with the business cycle. Assuming a gap
of the magnitude found at the height of the recession years 2011–2013 only
increases the indicator from 0.12 to 0.13.
These figures should be interpreted as the public cost of a marginal change
in immigration in that they do not take into account the costs of providing
fixed public goods, or as a conservative or lower bound estimate of the effect
on net costs in case the change in population size is not marginal. For
completeness, we have also computed an alternative estimate by assuming that
the provision of fixed public goods changes proportionally with the size of the
economy, GDP. Doing so, the SI becomes 0.28, implying that the 5000 fewer
non-Western immigrants give rise to an improvement in the SI of 0.32 percent-
age points. Thus, a change in non-Western immigration to Denmark of a
magnitude of annually around 0.1% of the total population will change the
fiscal sustainability indicator between 0.12 and 0.32 percentage points depend-
ing on what is assumed about its effect on the provision of fixed public goods.
In conclusion, let us return to our initial question. Is it possible for a country
like Denmark to use immigration to strengthen its fiscal sustainability? The
answer is yes—provided that the immigrants have good prospects for employment
and that they remain active on the labour market for a long time. As it is now,
immigrants from Western countries seem to have a positive impact on the econ-
omy, while non-Western immigrants have a negative fiscal impact, even if we
control for the low participation rates of refugees. The negative effect of immi-
gration from non-Western countries is the result of low rates of employment and
of early retirement from the labour market. Denmark is different from other
countries both because of its welfare model and because of its history of attracting
many immigrants with weak labour market prospects. The results reported here are
forecasts based on the boom year 2008 where the native-immigrant unemployment
gap was small. But the results are robust with respect to a change in the gap
similar to what could be observed during the recession years following 2008.
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Appendix. Dividing up the budget by sub-populations
In this paper, the total public sector budget is broken down according to the
gender, age and origin of individuals. Dividing up public income and expendi-
ture demands the use of a set of distribution keys. The key to be used depends
on which type of income or expenditure is involved and on the extent to which
the item in the budget can be linked to a specific population group.
Some budget items are distributed directly by definition, while others have to
be distributed subsequently. Overall, the following six principles describe the
way budget items are distributed by population groups.
Group 1 consists of items which are distributed directly by DREAM according to
gender, age and population group. This group is composed of the many items which are
linked to individuals by the definitions in microdata, such as wages, labour market
contribution tax, student grants, old-age pensions and disability pensions.
Group 2 is made up of items which are attributed only according to gender
and age in DREAM. These items are subsequently distributed according to
country of origin by relating them to the gender and age distributions of the
origin groups. They include, for example, inheritance tax.
Group 3 consists of items which are attributed only according to age in
DREAM. In order to divide up these items according to gender and origin, one
or other of the following is used as a distribution key:
(a) Disposable income (excluding interest). Examples of items attributed in this way
are VAT and other indirect taxes.
(b) The proportion of the adult population (above the age of 16) made up by the
population group. These items include, for example, voluntary contributions to
benefit schemes and capital transfers from the public sector.
Group 4 consists of items which are not initially distributed. These are distributed
according to gender, age and origin through the use of one or other of the following
distribution keys:
(a) Share of the adult population (above the age of 16) made up by the population
group in question. This distribution key is used for items which are only given to
or required from the adult population, such as corporate tax.
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(b) Share of the entire population made up by the population group in question. This
distribution key is used for items that concern the entire population. In particular,
it includes collective public services, such as central administration, defence and
road construction.
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